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atching southern Florida home prices 
spiral out of reach, Mr. Briar decided 
to take the plunge in 2004 and buy his first 
home.  The mortgage broker he worked 
with encouraged him to enter into a 2/28 
contract, in which the interest rate is fixed 
for the first two years and then resets to a 
higher floating rate.  Mr. Briar bought the 
home, and the mortgage broker transferred 
the loan to Wall Street, where it was pack-
aged and securitized into a collateralized 
debt obligation (CDO).  Mr. Briar struggled 
to pay his mortgage even during the first 
two years.  Meanwhile, Florida home prices 
plunged, and, eventually, Mr. Briar perma-
nently defaulted on his loan.  The servicing 
bank foreclosed nine months later.
Although Mr. Briar is a fictitious person, 
this story has played out for millions of 
households over the past few years.  Did Mr. 
Briar overreach by taking on too much hous-
ing debt, or was he duped by Wall Street?  
The answer is difficult to ascertain because 
it ultimately depends on the intentions of 
the borrower and the lender.  After the fact, 
a lender would hardly admit to deceiving a 
borrower, and the borrower would be more 
than willing to place at least some of the 
blame for the foreclosure on the lender.
Certainly, both predatory lending and 
household overreaching occurred during the 
subprime housing bubble.  But it is important 
to identify the primary reason for the foreclo-
sure crisis because the policy implications are 
vastly different.  If predatory lending was the 
primary culprit, strong consumer protection 
laws like those in the Dodd-Frank law might 
be sufficient to avoid a future foreclosure 
crisis; that’s because such laws would prevent 
Wall Street banks from making high-risk 
loans that borrowers could not possibly 
afford.  If household overreaching was the 
primary culprit, preventing another foreclo-
sure crisis is a much more complex policy 
challenge.  A return to high appreciation in 
home prices could again set off dynamics 
in which even borrowers with decent credit 
would overreach and end up in homes they 
ultimately couldn’t afford.  The only com-
prehensive solution might be to prevent the 
formation of asset price bubbles, a solution 
that would require policymakers, such as the 
central bank, to recognize and deflate such 
bubbles when they occur.
To distinguish between the predatory 
lending and overreaching hypotheses, we 
tapped two nationwide data sources to 
analyze the characteristics of households in 
foreclosure.  Because private motivations 
were unobservable, we argue that households 
with low income and education levels should 
be the most vulnerable to predatory lend-
ing practices because such borrowers, all 
else equal, are more likely to have a poorer 
understanding of the contract terms at the 
time of origination.  In contrast, households 
most susceptible to overreaching are those 
that have high economic aspirations relative 
to their current income and net worth; these 
households could already have relatively high 
incomes and be well-educated.
Profiles of Foreclosed Households
The data used in our analysis of foreclosed 
households came from two sources.  Realty-
Trac compiles nationwide data on homes 
in foreclosure.  Acxiom compiles data on 
millions of U.S. households each quarter and 
segments households based on economic, 
demographic and consumption patterns.  To 
obtain a profile of foreclosed households, we 
combined these two large datasets by house-
hold for the third quarter of 2008.  The data-
set contains more than 40 million records 
and more than 200,000 foreclosures.
Figure 1 presents key statistics from our 
dataset on households in foreclosure along-
side households not in foreclosure.  Defaulted 
homes were more expensive, on average.  The 
median market value of homes in foreclosure 
was $242,400 versus $199,129 for homes not 
in foreclosure.  As expected, the median 
loan-to-value ratio was much higher on 
defaulted properties, at 96 percent, which was 
more than 30 percentage points higher than 
on nondefaulted properties.  Homes in fore-
closure also were slightly newer and smaller 
in terms of square footage.
Household characteristics, shown in the 
bottom panel, reveal that households in 
foreclosure had slightly fewer members and 
were significantly younger.  The median 
head-of-household age for a foreclosed 
household was 44, eight years younger than 
the median for households not in foreclosure.  
Heads of households in foreclosed properties 
were less likely to be married and more likely 
to be single.  They had lower incomes and 
much shorter length of residence.  Although 
mean years of education were similar at just 
over 14, households in foreclosure had a 
median 12 years of education compared with 
a median of 16 years for households not in 
foreclosure.
Because we were interested in identifying 
the characteristics of households that were 
responsible for a disproportionate number 
of foreclosures, we looked beyond the simple 
averages described above.  PersonicX Life 
Stage Segmentation is an Acxiom classifica-
tion scheme that divides households into  
21 life stages based on marital status, number 
of children in the household, employment 
status and other socio-economic characteris-
tics.
1  A number and letter correspond to the 
name of each group listed in Figure 2.  The 
number corresponds to the age of the group, 
with lower numbers representing younger 
demographics; the letter approximates the 
group’s cultural generation.  Groups ending 
in B represent the Baby Boomers, while X 
and Y represent Generation X and Genera-
tion Y.  M represents the Mature generation, 
mostly those in their 50s and 60s, and S rep-
resents Seniors, most of whom are retired.  
To see which of the 21 PersonicX groups 
contributed the most disproportionately to 
the foreclosure crisis, we calculated the share 
of total foreclosures represented by each 
group and the share of all households rep-
resented by each group.  We subtracted the 
household share from the foreclosure share to 
derive the “excess foreclosure shares” of each 
group.  Group 07X, for example, accounted 
for 5.52 percent of all households but 11.3 
percent of all foreclosures.  The excess share 
of foreclosures is the difference of these two 
ratios, or 5.78 percentage points.  Figure 2 
plots the 11 PersonicX Groups with the high-
est excess foreclosure shares.
Figure 2 shows that excess foreclosures 
came primarily from younger, relatively afflu-
ent households, a finding more consistent 
with the overreaching hypothesis.  In parti-
cular, the group with the largest number of 
excess foreclosures was 07X, Cash & Careers.  
This Generation X group was the most 
prosperous of the generation of adults born 
in the mid-1960s and early 1970s.  Out of the 
first 10 PersonicX groups with excess fore-
closures, Cash & Careers members ranked 
first in average household income ($59,500), 
net worth and years of education (14.8).  The 
second most-overrepresented group in terms 
  Not in Foreclosure In Foreclosure
  Mean Median Mean Median
Property Characteristics
   Home Market Value $278,115 $199,129 $290,653 $242,400
   Home Purchase Amount $198,598 $140,000 $253,650 $199,950
   Loan to Value 64.6% 65.0% 90.7% 96.0%
   Year Home Built 1969 1974 1972 1978
   Home Size (square feet) 2,376 1,907 1,554 1,526
Household Characteristics        
   Household Size 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.0
   Annual Income $55,700 $51,500 $51,241 $48,800
   Years of Education 14.8 16.0 14.1 12.0
   Age 53.1 52.0 45.1 44.0
   Length of Residence 9.1 9.0 5.3 4.0
   Number of Children 1.4 1.0 1.5 1.0
   Married 70.7%   56.2%  
   Single 25.7%   36.9%  
U.S. Property and Household Characteristics by Foreclosure Status
FIgure 1
SOURCES:  Acxiom, RealtyTrac and authors’ own calculations.
of excess foreclosures was 02Y, Taking Hold.  
These were Generation Y households with an 
average age of 27.8 years, second-highest aver-
age income ($55,500), third-highest net worth 
and fifth-highest education level (14.1 years).  
These two groups’ characteristics were consis-
tent with our expectations of households that 
are most likely to overreach.
The two groups in Figure 2 that were most 
likely to be victims of predatory lending were 
Group 01Y, Beginnings and Group 06X, Mixed 
Singles because these groups ranked ninth 
or 10th in income, net worth and education.  
Yet these groups ranked seventh and eighth, 
Excess Foreclosure Percentages by PersonicX Group for U.S. Households
FIgure 2






















SOURCES:  Acxiom, RealtyTrac and authors’ own calculations.
Certainly, both predatory lending and household overreaching 
occurred during the subprime housing bubble.  But it is impor-
tant to identify the primary reason for the foreclosure crisis 
because the policy implications are vastly different.
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The figure shows the groups of people with the 
highest excess foreclosure rates.  The classifica-
tions come from Acxiom’s PersonicX Life Stage 
Segmentation.  In the names of the groups, the 
lower numbers represent younger people.  The 
letters after the numbers stand for:  B=Baby 
Boomers, X=generation X and Y=generation Y.  
For example, 07X Cash & Careers accounted for 
5.52 percent of all households but 11.3 percent 
of all foreclosures, meaning its excess share of 
foreclosures was 5.78 percentage points.
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 1 A list of the 21 PersonicX life stages and their 
descriptions is available from the Acxiom web 




Minsky, Hyman P.  Stabilizing An Unstable 
Economy.  new York:  McGraw Hill, 2008.  
Originally published by Yale University Press, 
new Haven, Conn., 1986. 
Agency House Price Index between 2000 and 
2007.  The areas with the most significant 
home appreciation are Florida and the states 
in the Southwest and in the northeast.
Figure 3 is a map of foreclosure rates 
by state for the third quarter of 2008.  The 
overreaching hypothesis suggests that there 
should be a strong correlation between the 
states with the greatest price increases and 
the states with the highest foreclosure rates.  
Indeed, the concentration of foreclosures in 
the Southwest and in Florida is consistent 
with overreaching as a more important 
explanation than predatory lending for 
the foreclosure crisis.  The main outliers in 
Figure 3 are the Great Lakes states, such as 
Michigan, Illinois, Indiana and Ohio, all of 
which experienced moderate home-price 
appreciation but relatively high foreclosure 
rates.  Foreclosures in these states are more 
likely driven by a weak economy rather than 
by housing price bubbles.
To more firmly support this visual evi-
dence, we ranked all of the 50 states by home 
price appreciation (between 2000 and 2007) 
and foreclosure rates (in 2008) to evaluate 
their statistical correlation.  The overreaching 
hypothesis suggests that these two char-
acteristics should be positively correlated.  
Indeed, for all the states, the correlation is 
0.23—positive as the overreaching hypothesis 
suggests, though not statistically different 
from zero.  When we exclude the Great Lakes 
states, however, the rank correlation rises to 
0.43 and is statistically significant.  Again, 
the evidence is more consistent with the over-
reaching hypothesis than with the predatory 
lending hypothesis.
Policy Response to Asset Bubbles
By combining household foreclosure data 
from RealtyTrac with household data from 
Acxiom, we were able to create a profile of 
households in foreclosure during the early 
stages of the financial crisis.  We found that 
many foreclosed households were young with 
relatively high income and education levels.  
Moreover, geographic foreclosure patterns 
were consistent with bubble dynamics as 
illustrated by the positive correlation between 
home-price appreciation and subsequent 
foreclosure rates.  The weight of the evidence  
supports the overreaching hypothesis.   
Consequently, strong predatory lending 
restrictions, while desirable, would likely  
be insufficient to avoid a future foreclosure 
crisis should another housing bubble emerge.
In our view, the ultimate underlying cause 
of the foreclosure crisis was the emergence of 
a significant housing price bubble and its sub-
sequent collapse.  Unfortunately, preventing 
asset price bubbles is a much more complex 
policy problem to address than protecting 
consumers from predatory lending.
The late economist Hyman Minsky argued 
that capitalist economies go through lever-
age cycles, in which credit access becomes 
progressively easier as an economy grows 
strongly.  The success of lenders and firms in 
the good years, combined with appreciating 
capital assets, reduces the perception of risk 
and encourages increasingly riskier financ-
ing.  Financial innovation exacerbates the 
leverage cycle as financial firms devise new 
ways to extend credit.  eventually, asset prices 
peak and then begin to decline, financial 
instability emerges and latent systemic risk is 
unleashed in a financial crisis.
This leverage cycle, which Minsky called 
the financial instability hypothesis, may be 
inherent to the capitalist system.  Minsky’s 
thesis might portray the subprime financial 
crisis quite well, but it also would suggest 
that future crises can result from asset 
bubbles in other sectors of the economy,  
not just housing.
If capitalist economies are subject to peri-
odic asset price bubbles, Minsky suggested 
that policymakers take steps to eliminate 
bubbles that threaten to become systemically 
important.  This, of course, requires the abil-
ity to 1) recognize an asset bubble, 2) classify 
the bubble as a systemic risk to the economy 
and 3) curb the formation of the bubble either 
through monetary policy actions or through 
more-targeted interventions, such as higher 
bank capital requirements or more stringent 
mortgage underwriting criteria.    
William R. Emmons is an economist at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  See  
stlouisfed.org/emmonsvitae for more on his 
work.  Kathy Fogel, Wayne Y. Lee, Liping Ma, 
Deena Rorie and Timothy J. Yeager are at the 
Sam M. Walton College of Business at the Uni-
versity of Arkansas.  See http://waltoncollege.
uark.edu/finn/PredatoryLendingOverreaching.
pdf for the complete research paper.
respectively, in share of excess foreclosures, 
and jointly, they accounted for just 2.67 
percentage points of excess foreclosures 
relative to 9.44 percentage points for groups 
07X and 02Y.
Rather than rely solely on Acxiom’s 
groupings, we also separated all the house-
holds into quadrants based on income and 
education to identify the most leveraged 
households in each quadrant based on their 
loan-to-income ratio.  We conjectured that 
the most over-leveraged households in 
the low-income, low-education (bottom) 
quadrant were more likely to be victims of 
predatory lending, while the most over-
leveraged households in the high-income, 
high-education (top) quadrant were more 
likely to have overreached.  Our tests showed 
that the most-leveraged households in the 
top quadrant were statistically more likely to 
enter foreclosure than the other households 
in the same quadrant.  This pattern was not 
true, however, for households in the bot-
tom quadrant.  Once again, overreaching 
appeared to be the more important explana-
tion of mortgage foreclosure.
Geographic Patterns of Foreclosures
In addition to household profiles, our 
hypotheses also have differing implications 
for the geographic distribution of foreclo-
sures.  The predatory lending hypothesis 
predicts that the geographic distribution of 
foreclosures will reflect the spatial distribu-
tion of low-income and low-educated house-
holds because bankers (or their brokers) will 
seek out households most easily deceived, 
regardless of the household’s location.  In 
contrast, the overreaching hypothesis 
predicts that bubble dynamics will be the 
important factor explaining the foreclosures.  
This hypothesis implies that foreclosure 
rates will spike in specific “hot spots” where 
households and speculators bid up prices in 
an effort to buy more-expensive homes before 
these homes become unaffordable.
We identified real estate hot spots using 
data from the Federal Housing Finance 
Annualized Foreclosure Rates, 2008:Q3 
SOURCE: RealtyTrac  
FIgure 3
The foreclosure percentages for each 
state were calculated by taking the 
annualized number of households that 
were in foreclosure during the third 
quarter of 2008 and dividing them  
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